Constitutional Ratemaking and the Affordable Care Act: A New Source of Vulnerability by Epstein, Richard A. & Stannard, Paula M.
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship
2012
Constitutional Ratemaking and the Affordable
Care Act: A New Source of Vulnerability
Richard A. Epstein
Paula M. Stannard
Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard A. Epstein & Paula M. Stannard, "Constitutional Ratemaking and the Affordable Care Act: A New Source of Vulnerability," 38
American Journal of Law and Medicine 243 (2012).
American Journal of Law & Medicine, 38 (2012):  243-268 
© 2012 American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics 
Boston University School of Law 
Constitutional Ratemaking and the 
Affordable Care Act: A New Source of 
Vulnerability 
Richard A. Epstein† & Paula M. Stannard†† 
I. INTRODUCTION: A MANY-FRONT WAR 
As this Article is being written, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) is being besieged with two different types of challenges. The first is a 
Commerce Clause challenge to the individual mandate on the ground that, although 
the Commerce Clause allows the government to “regulate” the transactions into 
which people choose to enter, it does not allow the state to force people to enter into 
disadvantageous transactions against their own will. The second of these challenges 
deals with the imposition of the Medicaid expansion provisions requiring a state to 
forego all of its additional Medicaid support unless it is prepared to extend Medicaid 
coverage, partially at its own expense, to individuals whose income levels put them 
at 100% to 133% of the federal poverty level. The charge is that this requirement 
represents, through the use of inappropriate conditions, an impermissible 
compromise of state sovereignty by forcing states to make the choice of taking on 
the costs of new programs or losing their federal support for their present program.  
In this Article, we suggest that the ACA should, and may well, be subject to a 
third constitutional challenge dealing with a portion of the statute that thus far has 
escaped systematic judicial scrutiny, but which is likely to loom far larger in 
importance if both parts of the ACA weather their constitutional assaults—or if the 
individual mandate is struck down, but the remainder of the ACA survives. We refer 
to the elaborate set of provisions that regulate health insurance providers in the 
private market, including their access to the health insurance exchanges, which lie at 
the core of the private market’s operation under the new statute.  
The reason that these provisions have thus far escaped judicial notice does not, 
we believe, have to do with the weakness of the underlying claims. Rather, we think 
that the real reason is that the conventional wisdom views these provisions—chiefly 
those dealing with the combination of guaranteed issue and renewal, pre-existing 
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conditions, community rating, rate review, and the medical loss ratio1—as not 
amenable to a facial challenge. A facial challenge, in this view, only works if the 
statute produces an unconstitutional outcome, in all states of the world, for the 
parties in question.2  
The normal approach is that such certainty is not attainable in the world of 
regulatory affairs. We dissent. In some ratemaking schemes, we think that it is 
possible to identify a system of restrictions so pervasive that this exacting condition 
is satisfied. Indeed one of us (Epstein) was for a time involved in the litigation over 
the Durbin Amendment, in which this attack failed.3 Nonetheless, we think that a 
reframed argument can meet the objections lodged against it by showing how the 
inefficiencies of that scheme of rate caps necessarily reduces consumer welfare in all 
states of the world.4 In connection with the Durbin Amendment, the deadly 
combination came in two parts. First, a sharp cut in competitive rates that could be 
collected from retailers. Second, the nominal right to collect money from retail 
customers that under no circumstances could offset the losses from retailers and 
which in fact did not yield any new revenues at all.  
The theory behind this approach is that the ratemaking cases under the United 
States Supreme Court tradition do not give the government the same degree of 
discretion in regulating a particular industry that has sunk costs as they do in 
allowing general price controls over the economy. The point is made very clear by 
contrasting two cases, both of which were decided in early 1944. United States v. 
Yakus
5 upheld a broad delegation of authority to the federal government to impose 
price controls on the overall economy based on historical costs, subject only to a 
very low level of judicial scrutiny, which has proved to be all but useless in 
practice.6 Just months before, the same Supreme Court, speaking through Justice 
Douglas, upheld a standard that required federal and state regulators to make sure 
that the rate of return on an equity owner’s invested capital was “sufficient to assure 
confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and 
to attract capital.”7 As Hope Natural Gas makes clear, the judicial examination of 
rate regulation does not turn on the steps that the government takes along the way in 
reaching its final ruling. Instead, it turns on the need for its bottom line to produce 
an “end result” that satisfies the substantive standard.8 In effect, Hope Natural Gas 
takes the view that complex ratemaking determinations involve many contested 
                                                 
1 The medical loss ratio (MLR) refers to the level of payout in claims and quality improvement 
activities relative to premiums collected. An increase in the MLR leaves less room for administrative 
expenses. A decrease in the MLR leaves more room for administrative expenses.  
2 See, e.g., Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 
U.S. 172, 190-91 (1985) (tying the reluctance to hear challenges prior to final decision to the use of 
constitutional balancing tests for regulatory takings); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation 
Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 295 (1981) (“Because appellees’ taking claim arose in the context of a facial 
challenge, it presented no concrete controversy concerning either application of the Act to particular 
surface mining operations or its effect on specific parcels of land.”).  
3 TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke (TCF I), No. CIV 10-4149, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45059, at *14 
(D.S.D. Apr. 25, 2011), aff’d 643 F.3d 1158 (8th Cir. 2011). 
4 Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Paradox of the Durbin Amendment: How Monopolies 
Are Offered Constitutional Protection Denied to Competitive Firms, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1307 (2011); 
Richard A. Epstein, Durbin’s Folly: The Erratic Course of Debit Card Markets, 7 COMPETITION 
POL’Y INT’L 58 (2011) [hereinafter, Epstein, Durbin’s Folly]. The arguments are developed in 
sufficient fullness that we shall not try to reproduce them here.  
5 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 422-23 (1944). 
6 Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944). 
7 Id. at 603. 
8 Id. at 601-02.  
CONSTITUTIONAL RATEMAKING AND THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 245 
findings, some of which can cut in favor of the regulated utility and some of which 
can cut against it. The “end result” standard in question forgives the individual 
errors in dealing with rate calculation on the ground that they will “cancel out” along 
the way. That determination, however, does not undermine the categorical nature of 
the final standard, such that, for example, any explicit effort to short-circuit that 
standard will result in constitutional invalidation. On this score, the key standard is 
rate of return, not the ability to avoid bankruptcy, which would give far more 
running room to state regulators.9 In Hope Natural Gas, the rate determination came 
in the context of a challenge to an individual rate, set in a specific hearing. That is 
the standard that will surely apply to any challenge brought against the various 
provisions that regulate the health insurance market here.  
In many cases, it is said that the high level of deference in ratemaking cases 
necessarily dooms this inquiry. We take a different view. There are, in fact, a 
number of important rate cases dealing with, for example, insurance and 
telecommunications, in which the government’s aggressive imposition of rate 
controls attracted successful constitutional challenge once the courts rightly 
understood the detailed operation of the particular industry.10 In our view, the 
multiple constraints that the ACA places on the operation of its voluntary 
exchanges—and on the operation of health insurance companies inside and outside 
of the exchanges—will sooner or later force the imposition of controls on rates and 
revenues that will, in combination, yield a confiscatory rate—if they have not done 
so already. In order to set the stage, Part II of this Article examines in some detail 
the key features of these provisions that lead to this judgment. Thereafter, Part III 
shall develop the constitutional arguments in greater detail. 
 II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE ACA’S INSURANCE MARKET PROVISIONS 
The ACA is a transformative statute that legislates in bold strokes. Taken 
together, the ACA’s private insurance market provisions11—applicable to group 
plans and to health insurance issuers offering coverage in the individual and group 
markets—impose significant new coverage mandates that will increase the cost of 
providing health insurance coverage. At the same time, the ACA’s private insurance 
market provisions will limit or prohibit the traditional insurance practices that enable 
insurers in other markets to price policies based on risk (either individual or group 
risk), and constrain premiums and rate increases. In addition, these provisions have 
two other features that increase their complexity and confusion. The first is that the 
government has extensive discretion in fleshing out by regulation the key provisions 
of Title I of the ACA. That situation is further compounded because the discretion 
extends not only to the articulation of the rules, but also to the granting of short-term 
                                                 
9 Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 810 F.2d 1168, 1179 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (“Hope Natural Gas talks not of an interest in avoiding bankruptcy, but an interest in 
maintaining access to capital markets, the ability to pay dividends, and general financial integrity.”); 
CalFarm Ins. v. Deukmejian, 771 P.2d 1247, 1253 n.9 (Cal. 1989) (“[I]f ‘insolvency’ is defined as 
‘bankruptcy,’ it is clear that rate relief cannot be confined to companies threatened with insolvency.”). 
10 See, e.g., Guar. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Gates, 916 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1990) (striking down insurance 
rates for insufficiency in guaranteeing a rate of return); Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. Engler, 257 F.3d 587 
(6th Cir. 2001) (setting aside a rate that did not allow the telephone company to obtain a positive rate 
of return). 
11 Located in Title I of the ACA, these provisions have varying effective dates, including upon 
enactment, or for plan/policy years beginning on or after September 23, 2010, January 1, 2012, or 
January 1, 2014. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, Part 
I, 124 Stat. 119, 130-271 (2010) (codified primarily in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A.). 
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waivers from the application of the rules that is in widespread use today, but subject 
to little or no published standards.12 Second, the basic provisions envision a 
completed dance between the federal and state governments whereby both have an 
important say on how the rates are determined. Under this system, the initial 
examination of the factual record is made by the states (if the states have “effective 
rate review programs”), with federal oversight and required reporting to the 
Department of Health & Human Services (HHS) which issues the rate determination, 
or by HHS if the states do not have effective rate review programs.13 The program 
necessarily requires close coordination between state and federal governments. The 
process is supposed to take place on an annual basis, but it seems unlikely that the 
review cycles can proceed on the rapid timetable needed to make all this work 
possible. The postponement of deadlines (which happened with the single debit 
interchange rate regulation published by the Federal Reserve Board14) is likely to 
become an integral part of the overall process.  
The complexity of the regulatory framework is matched by the magnitude of the 
ACA’s departure from the time-tested principles of insurance law. These principles 
start from two assumptions, both of which are violated by the ACA. The first 
assumption defends the principle of freedom of contract on matters of rates and 
coverage. The second holds that the greatest danger to an effective insurance market 
is the non-disclosure of key elements, going to the existence or magnitude of the 
risk, by the insured, not the insurer, who knows far less about the insured’s risk, 
such as the condition of a vessel for which an application of marine insurance was 
pending. In line with these principles, traditional insurance law gave the insurer the 
ability to determine whether to accept or reject a designated risk, and to determine 
the premiums to be charged to an insured, the policy limits, and the terms and 
conditions on which to issue the policy. In sharp contrast to the ACA, extensive 
duties to disclose were imposed on the applicants or insureds because they alone 
possessed the relevant knowledge about the nature and scope of the risk that they 
were asking the insurer to assume. An applicant/insured was required to make full 
disclosure of health, health status, and health risks. The insurer would analyze the 
information and determine whether to accept or reject a given risk (i.e., to cover a 
given risk), along with risk-based premiums for coverage, the policy limits, and the 
terms and conditions upon which it issued the policy. The principles that started with 
individual policies carried over to group insurance, which presented special 
complications of its own, given the heterogeneity of its members. To the extent that 
these risks were evenly distributed over the insured population, they tended to cancel 
each other out. When that happened, the focus of the analysis shifted to the group as 
a whole, and so, for the most part, the personal characteristics of the beneficiaries 
were not considered individually. 
                                                 
12 On the rule of law implications of this practice, see Richard A. Epstein, Government by 
Waiver, 7 NAT’L AFF. 39 (2011), available at http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/ 
detail/government-by-waiver. 
13 45 C.F.R. § 154.210 (2011). 
14 The Federal Reserve’s Final Regulations took effect on October 1, 2011. See Press Release, 
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (June 29, 2011), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20110629a.htm. The regulations were 
supposed to go into effect on July 21, 2011, the first year anniversary of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1075(9), 124 Stat. 
1376 (2010) (amending Electronic Fund Tranfer Act § 920(a)(9), 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (2010)) (“(9) 
EFFECTIVE DATE.—This subsection shall take effect at the end of the 12-month period beginning 
on the date of the enactment of the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010.”). That date was July 
21, 2010. 
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In this traditional environment, regulation of insurance companies was directed 
to two different issues. The first aspect of insurance regulation was a general form of 
consumer protection, which required full disclosure of the terms and conditions of 
policies or plans, and reviews to ensure that the insurers carried out the terms of 
their contracts with customers. The insurer’s own duty to disclose rates and terms 
did not negate the insured parties’ equally critical duty to disclose information about 
material risks. The second aspect of insurance regulation addressed insurer solvency, 
imposing certain financial requirements on insurers, to ensure that the insurer 
receiving premiums to provide coverage would retain sufficient reserves to enable it 
to pay the valid policy claims. Competitive forces generally determined premiums. 
Most state and federal regulation directed insurers to file their policies in order to 
give fair notice of the rates in question to both state officials and the public at large. 
In some instances, as with assigned risk pools in automobile insurance, the states 
imposed rate regulation, creating severe dislocations in the underlying markets, 
owing to the elaborate cross-subsidies involved. 
As we move to a specific discussion of the health insurance market provisions, 
it is important to note how such provisions apply with respect to plans and policies 
offered on the exchanges, as opposed to outside the exchanges, and how such 
provisions apply to pre-existing (or grandfathered) forms of coverage. The 
provisions discussed below specifically apply to plans and policies offered for sale 
in the private market. In general, they usually apply to plans and policies offered for 
sale on the exchanges in the same way. There are several notable exceptions: any 
large group plans that are offered on the exchanges, as permitted by state decision 
beginning in 2017, have to offer the essential health benefits package.15 They must 
also provide their plans with actuarial values meeting the “metallic” levels. Any 
large group plans offered in the private market, however, do not have to meet these 
requirements.16 
Under the ACA, only a subset of the health insurance market provisions apply to 
plans and policies that existed as of the adoption of the ACA (“grandfathered 
plans”). Accordingly, the ACA permits family members and new employees to be 
added to such plans or policies without the loss of grandfathered status.17 In contrast, 
the provision requiring coverage of dependents up to twenty-six years of age applies 
to grandfathered plans, except that, for plan years before 2014, it only applies to 
group plans if the child is not eligible to enroll in eligible employer-sponsored 
coverage.18 The prohibitions on pre-existing condition exclusions and excessive 
waiting periods apply only to those grandfathered plans that are group plans.19 The 
provision barring rescission, except for misrepresentation or fraud, applies to 
grandfathered plans.20 The bar on lifetime limits on essential health benefits applies 
to all grandfathered plans, while the bar on annual limits applies only to 
grandfathered plans that are group plans.21 The medical loss ratio (MLR) provision 
applies to all grandfathered plans, as does the requirement for the development and 
distribution of the summary of benefits and coverage.22 The implementing 
regulations adopted by HHS, the Department of Labor, and the Treasury Department 
                                                 
15 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1332(a)(1), (b)(1)(A). 
16 See infra at Part A.1. 
17 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1251(b)-(c). 
18 Id. § 1251(a)(4)(A)(iv), (B)(ii). 
19 Id. § 1251(a)(4)(B)(i)-(ii). 
20 Id. § 1251(a)(4)(A)(iii). 
21 Id. § 1251(a)(4)(A)(ii), (B)(i). 
22 Id. § 1251(a)(3). 
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(1) permit states to impose stricter requirements on grandfathered plans; and (2) 
apply separately to each benefit package available under a grandfathered health plan.  
The status of grandfathered plans is not secure under the ACA. The following 
changes would cause a grandfathered plan to lose its grandfathered status under the 
regulations: (1) changes in the scope of benefits; (2) increases in percentage cost-
sharing requirements; (3) increases in fixed-amount cost-sharing (other than co-
payments), except if limited to medical inflation plus fifteen percentage points; (4) 
increases in co-payments, except if limited to the above, or five dollars plus medical 
inflation; (5) decreases in the employer contribution rate of more than five percent 
below the March 2010 rate; (6) addition of an annual limit on the dollar value of 
benefits for a plan that did not impose overall annual or lifetime limits as of March 
23, 2010; (7) addition of an annual limit for a plan that imposed only a lifetime limit, 
unless the annual limit is not less than the lifetime limit; or (8) any lowering of 
annual limits for plans that had an annual limit as of March 23, 2010.23 It is 
commonly understood that the rate of change in technology, economic conditions, 
and consumer preferences often drove routine modifications in basic plan structure. 
It is unclear whether the loss of grandfathered status will slow down that process. 
A. ACA COVERAGE MANDATES 
1. Essential Health Benefits  
Traditionally, the benefits covered by an individual health insurance policy or 
group plan were the subject of negotiation, with benefit packages tailored to the 
needs of the individuals or groups being covered by the policy or plan, taking into 
account the features of the group as a whole. The general proposition stated above, 
that it is proper to ignore individual variations within a group, does not entail that 
differences between different employee populations should be ignored. Employers 
do not group themselves randomly, but often sort themselves out by age, sex, 
occupation, or education. The differences between these groups often called for 
different types of coverage or different rates for the same type of coverage. For 
example, a workforce of professionals may have only a tiny fraction of the physical 
injuries of an industrial workgroup.  
Much of that flexibility is lost under the ACA. With the ACA, non-
grandfathered plans in the individual and small group markets, whether offered on a 
health benefit exchange or not, are required to cover “the essential health benefits 
package.”24 As drafted, the same basic structure of benefits applies to all plans 
regardless of the difference in their internal composition. Given the detailed nature 
of the requirements, the regulatory impact is likely to differ across plans. The point 
is made evident by looking at some of the key provisions. For starters, section 
1302(b) requires that HHS determine, on a periodic basis, the “essential health 
benefits” to be included in the mandated coverage benefits package. These essential 
                                                 
23 See 45 C.F.R. § 147.140 (2011). 
24 Public Health Service Act § 2707(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-6 (West 2012), amended by Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1201 (an “essential health benefits package” is defined by HHS 
under ACA section 1302(a)). Although large group plans and issuers are not required to provide the 
essential health benefits, to the extent that such plans provide them, they cannot impose lifetime or 
annual limits on such benefits. See infra Part A.III. Furthermore, to the extent that, after 2016, states 
elect to permit sellers of large group plans on their exchanges, such large group plans offered on the 
exchanges (but not those offered outside of the exchanges) have to offer the essential health benefits 
package. 
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health benefits must, by statute, include items and services within ten benefit 
categories: ambulatory patient services; emergency services; hospitalization; 
maternity and newborn care; mental health and substance abuse disorder services; 
prescription drugs; rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices; laboratory 
services; preventive and wellness services and chronic disease management; and 
pediatric services.25 Each of these bristles with interpretive difficulties. The statute 
also dictates that HHS ensure that the essential health benefits reflect “an 
appropriate balance” among these types of services, do not discriminate against 
individuals because of age, disability, or life expectancy, and cover the full “health 
needs of diverse segments of the population, including women, children, persons 
with disabilities, and other groups.”26 Only plans that offer the essential health 
benefits package (and meet other requirements) can be designated as “qualified 
health plans,” be offered on the exchanges, and be purchased by individuals who are 
eligible for financial assistance under the ACA.27 
The scope of essential health benefits is required to equal the scope of benefits 
provided under a typical employer plan.28 HHS has not yet promulgated a regulatory 
definition of that term (nor indeed of virtually any of the key concepts set out 
above), but has issued a bulletin indicating its intent to propose that the essential 
health benefits package be defined by a state-selected benchmark plan. That 
benchmark plan, in turn, “would serve as a reference plan, reflecting both the scope 
of services and any limits offered by a ‘typical employer plan’ in that State.”29 For 
2014 and 2015, states can select a benchmark plan from among four benchmark plan 
types identified by Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).30 If a state 
does not make an election, the default state benchmark plan would be the largest 
plan by enrollment in the largest product in the state’s small group market.31 If one 
of the ten benefit categories is not covered by the selected benchmark plan, the state 
would be required to supplement the plan, again with uncertain financial and 
coverage implications. 
The ACA also dictates that four categories of plans be offered through the 
exchanges and in the individual and small group market, all of which would have to 
provide the essential health benefits. The only difference in the plan categories is the 
percentage of the actuarial value of the benefits covered by the plan, with the bronze 
category covering sixty percent of the benefits’ cost, the silver category covering 
seventy percent of the benefits’ cost, the gold category covering eighty percent of 
the benefits’ cost, and the platinum category covering ninety percent of the benefits’ 
cost.32  
                                                 
25 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1302(b)(1).  
26 Id. § 1302(b)(4). 
27 Id. § 1301(a)(1)(B). 
28 Id. § 1302(b)(2). 
29 CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS BULLETIN 8 (2011), available at http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/ 
files/Files2/12162011/essential_health_benefits_bulletin.pdf.  
30 Id. at 9. 
31 Id. HHS intends to assess the benchmark process for 2016 and beyond based on evaluation and 
feedback. 
32 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1302(d). The ACA permits issuers to offer a 
catastrophic plan only in the individual market to individuals who are less than thirty years of age, or 
those exempt from the requirements to maintain “minimum essential coverage” pursuant to provisions 
relating to individuals without affordable coverage options or with hardship exemptions. Id. 
§ 1302(e). 
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2. Cost-Sharing  
The ACA limits the ability of plans and issuers to require cost-sharing. The total 
cost-sharing (including deductibles, co-insurance, co-payments, etc.) for all 
categories is the same; it is set for 2014 at the total out-of-pocket expenses permitted 
for health savings accounts high deductible plans and may be adjusted for health 
insurance inflation.33 The size of the deductible is limited to $2000 for an individual 
and $4000 for a family in the small group market, amounts that may be subject to 
adjustment.34 For persons between 100% and 400% of the federal poverty level, the 
ACA further reduces the out-of-pocket limits insurers are permitted to require.35 
3. Lifetime and Annual Limits  
Public Health Service (PHS) Act section 2711 bars group health plans and 
health insurance issuers in the group or individual market from imposing lifetime or 
annual limits on the dollar value of the essential health benefits. Prior to 2014, 
“restricted annual limits” may be imposed for essential health benefits.36 Plans and 
issuers can impose lifetime and annual limits on benefits that are not essential health 
benefits.37 As noted above, the bar on lifetime limits on essential health benefits 
applies to all grandfathered plans, while the bar on annual limits applies only to 
grandfathered plans that are group plans. 
4. Specific Benefit Mandates  
In addition, the ACA also dictates that certain specific benefits must be offered.  
a. Preventive Services 
Under PHS Act section 2713, group health plans and health insurance issuers 
offering group or individual health insurance coverage are required to provide 
coverage for preventive health services—without cost-sharing.38 
                                                 
33 Id. § 1302(c)(1), (4); I.R.C. § 223(c)(2)(A)(ii) (West 2012). 
34 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1302(c)(2), (4). 
35 Id. § 1402. 
36 Public Health Service Act § 2711(a)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. 300gg-11 (West 2012), amended by 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1001. This limit is $750,000, $1.25 million, and $2 
million, respectively, for plan years starting between September 23, 2010, and September 22, 2011; 
September 23, 2011, and September 22, 2012; and September 23, 2012, and January 1, 2014. 45 
C.F.R. § 147.126(d) (2010). HHS provided a process for limited benefit, or mini-med, plans to obtain 
a waiver of these limits, to permit such coverages to continue to have lower annual limits for essential 
health benefits, id. § 147.126(d)(3), but has ceased accepting applications for such waivers. The 
provision applies to grandfathered plans and coverages, except that annual limits do not apply to 
grandfathered individual health insurance coverages. 
37 Public Health Service Act § 2711; 45 C.F.R. § 147.126(b)(1). Prior to the issuance of 
regulations defining essential health benefits, the enforcing agencies will accept good faith efforts to 
comply with a reasonable interpretation of the term, as long as the plan or issuer applies the definition 
consistently. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Preexisting Condition Exclusions, 
Lifetime and Annual Limits, Rescissions, and Patient Protections, 75 Fed. Reg. 37188, 37191 (June 
28, 2010). 
38 See Public Health Service Act § 2713. The ACA identifies the categories of services 
considered to be “preventive.” See id. § 2713(a). Plans are not required to cover out-of-network 
preventive services and may impose cost-sharing requirements with respect to such services. 45 
C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(3). 
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b. Dependent Coverage 
Under new PHS Act section 2714, if a group health plan or a health insurance 
issuer offering group or individual coverage provides dependent coverage, the plan 
must make such coverage available for adult children up to age twenty-six.39 As 
noted above, this provision applies to grandfathered plans, except that, for plan years 
before 2014, it only applies to group plans if the child is not eligible to enroll in 
eligible employer-sponsored coverage. 
c. Choice of Healthcare Professionals and Referral Requirements  
If the designation of a primary care physician is a feature of a group plan or 
individual policy, the plan or insurer must permit the designation of any 
participating primary care physician (including a pediatrician, for children) available 
to accept the individual.40 If coverage is provided for obstetrical or gynecological 
care, the plan or issuer cannot require authorization or referral of a female enrollee 
seeking such care from in-network specialists.41 Covered hospital emergency 
department services must be permitted without prior authorization and coverage 
limitations, regardless of the hospital’s status under the plan or policy; cost-sharing 
for out-of-network emergency department services is required to be the same as for 
in-network hospitals.42  
d. Approved Clinical Trials 
The ACA bars health plans and insurers offering group or individual market 
coverage from (1) prohibiting qualified individuals43 from participating in approved 
clinical trials;44 (2) denying, limiting, or placing conditions on the coverage of 
routine patient costs (items or services consistent with plan coverage for qualified 
individuals not enrolled in a clinical trial) associated with participation in such a 
clinical trial; and (3) discriminating against qualified individuals on the basis of their 
participation in approved clinical trials.45 
The ACA “coverage mandates”—coupled with the limitation on cost-sharing 
(and the bar on cost-sharing for “preventive services”) by beneficiaries and plan 
participants—will likely spur utilization (and over-utilization) of covered services by 
beneficiaries. This will inevitably increase the cost to plans and issuers of providing 
coverage. 
                                                 
39 Public Health Service Act § 2714. This requirement applies to grandfathered plans; prior to 
2014, such plans are not required to make dependent coverage available for adult children who can 
enroll in their employer’s health plan. 
40 Id. § 2719A(a), (c); 45 C.F.R. § 147.138(a)(1)-(2). 
41 Public Health Service Act § 2719A(d); 45 C.F.R. § 147.138(a)(3). Regulations promulgated 
under the PHS Act section 2719A require that applicable plans provide notice of these rights to each 
participant. 45 C.F.R. § 147.138(a)(4). 
42 Public Health Service Act § 2719A(b); 45 C.F.R. § 147.138(b). 
43 Public Health Service Act § 2709(b). 
44 Id. § 2709(d) (generally limited to clinical trials relating to the prevention, detection or 
treatment of cancer or other life-threatening diseases or conditions, and approval or funding by certain 
federal agencies or a study/investigation conducted under an Investigational New Drug (IND) 
application reviewed by the Food and Drug Administration or exempted from an IND application). 
45 Id. 
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B. ACA CHANGES TO TRADITIONAL INSURANCE PRACTICES 
At the same time that the ACA’s coverage mandates are likely to increase the 
cost of coverage, other ACA provisions limit the ability of plans and health 
insurance issuers to engage in traditional insurance practices that would enable them 
to control or limit the risk they accept, especially in the small group and individual 
markets. 
1. Exclusions or Limitations of Coverage for Pre-Existing Conditions  
The ACA bars exclusion of coverage for pre-existing conditions.46 Group health 
plans and issuers offering group or individual coverage cannot impose any pre-
existing condition exclusions47 with respect to such plans or coverage.48 The ACA 
bars exclusion of coverage for certain benefits, as well as complete exclusion from 
the plan or coverage, if the exclusion is based on a pre-existing condition.49 This 
provision applies to grandfathered plans that are group plans.50 
2. Waiting Periods 
The ACA bars any group health plan and any group health insurer from 
imposing any waiting period greater than ninety days.51 This prohibition applies to 
grandfathered plans that are group plans.52 
3. Health Status, Eligibility for Insurance, and Premiums 
The ACA also bars health plans from basing eligibility or premiums on certain 
health status factors. Group health plans and group or individual health insurers 
cannot establish rules for eligibility (or continued eligibility) based on certain health-
related factors of an individual or a dependent of an individual. These factors include 
health status, medical condition, claims experience, receipt of healthcare, medical 
history, genetic information, evidence of insurability, disability, or any other HHS-
                                                 
46 Id. § 2704(a). 
47 Defined as “a limitation or exclusion of benefits relating to a condition based on the fact that 
the condition was present before the date of enrollment for such coverage, whether or not any medical 
advice, diagnosis, care, or treatment was recommended or received before such date.” Id. 
§ 2704(b)(1)(A). 
48 Id. § 2704. The provision applies to enrollees under the age of nineteen for plan or policy years 
beginning on or after September 23, 2010, and to all others for plan or policy years beginning on or 
after January 1, 2014. Id. § 1255. The prohibition on pre-existing condition exclusion also applies to 
grandfathered plans that are group health plans. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-148, § 1251 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 18011 (West 2012)). 
49 Prior to the ACA, under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
(HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, pre-existing condition exclusion rules applied only to group health 
plans and group health insurance coverage, and permitted exclusions of coverage based on pre-
existing conditions under certain circumstances. Compare Public Health Service Act § 2701(b)(1), 42 
U.S.C. § 300gg (2006), amended by Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1201, with Public 
Health Service Act § 2704(b)-(g), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-3 (West 2012). Where an individual had 
eighteen months of “creditable coverage” and had previously been covered by one of several types of 
plans, individual market insurers were barred from imposing a pre-existing condition exclusion, 
unless the state provided an alternative mechanism by which to cover such individual. Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2741(a)(1)(B), (b). 
50 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1251(a)(4)(b)(i). 
51 Public Health Service Act § 2708. A “waiting period” is “the period that must pass with 
respect to the individual before the individual is eligible to be covered for benefits under the terms of 
the plan.” Id. § 2704(b)(4). 
52 Id. § 1251(a)(4)(a)(i). 
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designated health-status-related factor.53 Similarly, such entities may not require any 
individual, based on any health-status-related factor, to pay a premium or 
contribution greater than such premium or contribution for a similarly situated 
individual.54 Group health plans may, however, continue to offer premium discounts 
or rewards based on enrollee participation in wellness programs.55 
4. Guaranteed Issuance and Renewability56 
The ACA requires, subject to certain limitations, that each health insurance 
issuer offering health insurance coverage in the individual or group market in a state 
must accept every employer and individual in the state that applies for such 
coverage.
57
 An insurer may restrict enrollment to open and special enrollment 
periods; limit, subject to certain restrictions, enrollment in networked plans based on 
the service area and capacity of the networked plan; and deny coverage if the issuer 
does not have the financial reserves necessary to underwrite additional coverage.58 
Upon denying coverage based on network or financial capacity, however, the issuer 
may not offer coverage in the group or individual market for a period of 180 days 
(or, with respect to financial capacity, until the issuer has demonstrated to the 
applicable state authority, if required, that it has sufficient financial reserves to 
underwrite additional coverage).59 The ACA also adopts and reiterates the pre-
existing provisions requiring guaranteed renewability of coverage at the option of 
the sponsor or policyholder.60 
5. Prohibition on Rescissions 
PHS Act section 2712 allows rescission of coverage—cancellation or 
discontinuance of the coverage with retroactive effect—by a group health plan or a 
                                                 
53 Id. § 2705(a).  
54 Id. § 2705(b)(1). Prior to the ACA, HIPAA and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination 
Act of 2008 barred group health plans and issuers from establishing eligibility rules for individuals, or 
requiring individuals to pay premiums or contributions greater than such premiums or contributions 
paid by other individuals in the plan, based on certain health-status-related factors (including genetic 
information). Public Health Service Act § 2702, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 (2006), amended by Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1201(3)(A). However, with the exception of genetic 
information, PHS Act section 2753, such limitations did not apply in the individual health insurance 
market. Public Health Service Act § 2753. 
55 Public Health Service Act § 2705(b)(2)(B), (j). 
56 “Guaranteed issuance” is the requirement that the health insurance issuer accept every 
applicant for health coverage, as long as the applicant agrees to the terms and conditions of the 
insurance offer (premiums, out-of-pocket costs, and coverage limitations). “Guaranteed renewability” 
is the requirement on a plan or health insurance issuer to renew group or individual coverage at the 
option of the plan sponsor or policyholder, respectively. 
57 Id. § 2702(a). The provision is based on a similar pre-ACA provision that was applicable only 
to the small group market. See Public Health Service Act § 2711, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11, amended by 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1001(3). In limited circumstances, where individuals 
had eighteen months of creditable coverage, individual market insurers were required to guarantee 
issue policies. See Public Health Service Act § 2741(a)(1)(B), (b). 
58 Public Health Service Act § 2702(b)-(d). In the latter two circumstances, the issuer may be 
required to demonstrate to the applicable state authority that it is applying the restriction uniformly to 
all employers and individuals, without regard to the claims experience of the individuals, employers 
and employees, and their dependents, or to any health-status-related factor. Id. 
59 Id. § 2702(c)(2), (d)(2). 
60 See id. § 2703 (requiring renewal or continuation of coverage except for non-payment of 
premium, fraud, violation of participation or contribution rates, termination of coverage, movement 
outside the service area, cession of association membership, and providing for uniform modification 
of coverage), amended by Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1201; see also id. § 2742. 
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group or individual health insurance issuer only for a covered individual “who has 
performed an act or practice that constitutes fraud or makes an intentional 
misrepresentation of material fact as prohibited by the terms of the plan or 
coverage.”61 Prior to the ACA, this heightened standard for rescission did not exist 
under most state insurance law, which also allowed rescission in cases of material 
nondisclosure. Under the ACA, moreover, cancellation requires prior notice to the 
enrollee.62 Implementing regulations require that the entity provide “at least 30 days 
advance written notice to each participant (in the individual market, primary 
subscriber) who would be affected before coverage may be rescinded . . . regardless 
of, in the case of group coverage, whether the coverage is insured or self-insured, or 
whether the rescission applies to an entire group or only to an individual within the 
group.”63 This provision applies to grandfathered plans.64 
6. Community Rating 
The ACA prohibits health insurance issuers in the individual or small group 
market from varying premium rates, except with respect to: age (where the permitted 
maximum variation is 3:1); state premium rating areas; family composition 
(individual or family); and tobacco use (where the maximum permitted variation is 
1.5:1).65 These limits also apply to all large group plans and insurers (whether 
offered on the exchange or outside of the exchange) if a state permits health 
insurance issuers offering such coverage to offer it through the exchange.66  
7. The Adverse Selection Risk 
Taken together, these provisions require the covered plans and insurers to cover 
any group or individual that applies (and pays the premiums), prevent insurers from 
charging different premiums based on different risks (except in very limited 
circumstances), and require them to cover such groups’ or individuals’ health 
expenses, regardless of any health conditions that predated the coverage. The 
provisions create significant risk of adverse selection by permitting individuals, with 
the payment of a penalty that is relatively insignificant compared to the cost of the 
health insurance coverage, to engage in strategic behavior by consciously foregoing 
the purchase of health insurance until they become ill or otherwise decide that they 
want to obtain certain healthcare services. Once that crisis is past, they may drop the 
health insurance with impunity in order, once again, to take advantage of the low 
penalty for dropping coverage. Opening up this opportunity for some will, in turn, 
necessarily increase the cost of health insurance for those who purchase it over the 
long run, especially since insurance companies are required to meet the ACA’s 
coverage mandates, and cannot adjust the level of services provided in order to 
decrease the cost of the coverage. The higher rates have the real risk of increasing 
the fraction of individuals who join and withdraw strategically from these plans. 
Done over several iterations, the additional rounds of adverse selection could lead to 
a potential death spiral for insurance companies. 
                                                 
61 Id. § 2712.  
62 Id. 
63 45 C.F.R. § 147.128(a)(1) (2010). 
64 Id. § 147.128(c). 
65 Public Health Service Act § 2701(a)(1). 
66 Id. § 2701(a)(5). Large group employers would be permitted to access the health insurance 
exchanges under ACA section 1312(f)(2)(B). 
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The ACA also creates several programs for transfer payments among health 
insurance issuers. States are required to establish a transitional reinsurance program 
“to help stabilize premiums for coverage in the individual market in a State during 
the first 3 years of operation of an Exchange . . . when the risk of adverse selection 
related to new rating rules and market changes is greatest.”67 In the program, 
assessments are collected from all insurers and third-party administrators on behalf 
of group plans for the period 2014-2016; the amounts collected under the program 
are earmarked for reinsurance payments to health insurance issuers that cover high 
risk individuals (as that term is defined in the ACA) in the individual market.68  
The ACA also contains a transitional risk corridor program that HHS is to run 
for 2014-2016 in order to equalize burdens across plans.69 Under this program, HHS 
will collect amounts from qualified health plans in the small and individual market 
(including exchanges) if their allowable costs (total costs other than administrative 
costs) are less than a certain percentage of the target amount (total premium reduced 
by the administrative costs) and will pay amounts (according to a preset formula) to 
such health plans if the plan’s allowable costs exceed the target amount.70  
Finally, each state is to establish a permanent risk adjustment program. Pursuant 
to the program, the state is to assess a charge on health plans and health insurance 
issuers in the individual or small group market (both in and outside the exchange) if 
the actuarial risk of its enrollees is less than the average actuarial risk of all enrollees 
in all plans or coverage in the state.71 In line with the overall objective of equalizing 
risk across plans, it will provide payments to plans if the actuarial risk of the plans’ 
enrollees for the year is greater than the average actuarial risk of all enrollees in all 
plans or forms of coverage in the state for the year.72 The ACA directs HHS to 
establish criteria and methods to be used in the program.73  
These authorized transfer payments from some health insurers to other health 
insurers are ostensibly based on the relative risks or costs of the individuals they 
cover. The programs, however, are subject to two serious objections.  
The first is that the forces of adverse selection may prove so powerful that all 
insurers find themselves subject to coverage obligations that exceed their revenues. 
That outcome could happen if future patients gravitate in large numbers to the 
insurers whose healthcare insurance profile best fits their needs, resulting in overall 
increases in utilization. If this situation results, all programs would be eligible to 
receive transfers, but none could be obliged to provide it, which is clearly an 
unsustainable position.  
The second objection, which applies whenever one insurer sustains heavier 
losses than others, is that the transfer obligations can at most postpone the problem 
facing insurance companies, without directly addressing the adverse selection risk. It 
follows that the ACA’s efforts to equalize risk will not prevent the downward 
insurance spiral described above. Nothing in these provisions addresses the risk of 
adverse selection or strategic behavior on the part of individuals who can decide to 
purchase health insurance only when they want or need healthcare services. The 
statutory design of the ACA thus fails to confront directly the likely spiral of 
                                                 
67 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1341 (2010), 124 Stat. 
119, 208-11 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A § 18061 (West 2012)). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. § 1342(a). 
70 Id. § 1342. 
71 Id. § 1343(a)(1). 
72 Id. § 1343(a)(2). 
73 Id. § 1343(b). 
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increasing costs driving increasing premiums and driving more individuals to join 
and withdraw strategically from the plans. 
Beyond these substantive requirements, the ACA contains several provisions 
that impose significant procedural, reporting, and/or disclosure requirements on 
group health plans and health insurers in the group and individual markets, including 
the provisions which require (1) group health plans and insurers in the group and 
individual markets to have an effective internal claims appeal process and external 
review process;74 (2) the establishment of an Internet portal by which the public can 
access information about all available insurance products, for which health insurers 
are required to submit detailed information to HHS on each of their small group and 
individual market products and “portal plans;”75 (3) health insurers, including group 
plans and sponsors of self-insured group plans, to create a summary of benefits and 
coverage explanation, containing information on the coverage provided by each plan 
or policy (including grandfathered plans) and to provide it to applicants, enrollees, 
and policy or certificate holders;76 (4) group plans and insurers offering group or 
individual coverage to make available certain information about itself and its 
practices;77 and (5) group plans and insurers offering group or individual coverage to 
provide annual reports to HHS and to their enrollees on activities undertaken to 
improve quality of care, health outcomes, and wellness and health promotion.78 
C. ACA PROVISIONS RESTRICTING PREMIUMS AND RATE INCREASES 
There are several provisions that explicitly or implicitly restrict the amount of 
premiums or revenue that a health insurance company can earn under the ACA. 
1. Review of “Unreasonable” Rate Increases  
The ACA requires HHS and the states to establish a process for reviewing 
increases in health plan premiums, and requires plans to justify increases.79 It 
requires the states to report on trends in premium increases and recommend whether 
certain plans should be excluded from the exchanges because of unjustified premium 
increases.80 Plans may well have to accept smaller premium increases than would be 
economically appropriate to avoid being excluded from the exchanges. Specifically, 
PHS Act section 2794,81 applicable to the small group and individual health 
insurance markets, requires HHS, in conjunction with the states, to establish a 
process for the annual review of “unreasonable increases in premiums for health 
insurance coverage.”82 Health insurance issuers must submit to HHS and the relevant 
state a justification for unreasonable premium increases prior to the implementation 
of the increase.83 HHS is required to ensure public disclosure of information on such 
                                                 
74 Public Health Service Act § 2719(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 (2006), amended by Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act § 10101(g), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-19 (West 2012). 
75 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1103(a); 45 C.F.R. § 159.100 (2010). 
76 Public Health Service Act § 2715. 
77 Id. § 2715A. 
78 Id. § 2717. 
79 Id. § 2794(a). 
80 Id. § 2794(b). 
81 Id. § 2794. 
82 Id. § 2794(a)(1). 
83 Id. § 2794(a)(2). 
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increases and the justifications therefore, and such issuers are required to post 
prominently such information on their websites.84 
Implementing regulations require insurers seeking rate increases of ten percent 
or more, for non-grandfathered plans in the small group and individual markets, to 
submit a preliminary justification to HHS and/or the relevant state on such proposed 
increases prior to implementation of the increase.85 This review process involves the 
submission of extensive data.86 HHS will publicly disclose such information on its 
website, consistent with its Freedom of Information Act regulations.87 The rates will 
be reviewed by the state (if it has an “effective rate review program”);88 otherwise, 
HHS will conduct the review.89 In that case, HHS will determine that an increase is 
an “unreasonable rate increase” if it is an “excessive rate increase,”90 an “unjustified 
rate increase,”91 or an “unfairly discriminatory rate increase”92—and will post its 
determination on its website. If an insurer decides to proceed with an increase 
despite a CMS or state determination of its “unreasonableness,” it must submit to 
CMS a final justification, and post on its website (for at least three years) the 
information on the increase posted on the Internet by CMS, the CMS or state final 
determination, and its final justification.93 
While HHS does not have authority to reject rate increases, HHS has, 
nevertheless, called upon certain health insurance issuers to rescind putatively 
unreasonable proposed premium increases. For example, HHS Secretary Kathleen 
Sebelius recently stated with respect to rate increases proposed by one insurer: “It’s 
                                                 
84 Id. 
85 45 C.F.R. §§ 154.200(a), 154.215(a)-(g) (2011). 
86 Id. As of September 1, 2012, the ten percent threshold may be replaced by a state-specific 
threshold determined by HHS. Id. § 154.200(a)(2). The preliminary justification must include 
information and data on a number of issues, including a rate increase summary and a written 
description justifying the rate increase. Id. § 154.215(e). The written description has to include a 
narrative describing the data and assumptions used to develop the rate increase, an “[e]xplanation of 
the most significant factors causing the rate increase, including a brief description of the relevant 
claims and non-claims expense increases reported in the rate increase summary,” and a “[b]rief 
description of the overall experience of the policy, including historical and projected expenses, and 
loss ratios.” Id. § 154.215(f). 
87 Id. § 154.215(i). 
88 Id. § 154.210(a)-(b). The regulations set forth the factors that HHS will consider with respect 
to each insurance market in the state in determining whether a state has an effective rate review 
program. Id. § 154.301(a).  
89 As of February 16, 2012, HHS will conduct some or all of the review in seven states and two 
territories as to the increases proposed for the small group and individual market, and in twenty-two 
states with respect to increases proposed for association products. Health Insurance Rate Reviews: 
Lowering Costs for American Consumers and Businesses, List of Effective Review Programs, CTR. 
FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/factsheets/rate_review_fact_sheet.html (updated Feb. 16, 2012). 
90 A rate increase is excessive if it “causes the premium charged for the health insurance 
coverage to be unreasonably high in relation to the benefits provided under the coverage,” based on 
(1) whether it results in an MLR below the Federal MLR standard in the relevant market; (2) whether 
any assumptions are not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) whether the choice or combination 
of assumptions on which the rate increase is based is unreasonable. 45 C.F.R. § 154.205(b). 
91 An increase is unjustified if the issuer provides data or documentation that is “incomplete, 
inadequate or otherwise does not provide a basis upon which the reasonableness of an increase may be 
determined.” Id. § 154.205(c). 
92 An increase is unfairly discriminatory if it “results in premium differences between insureds 
within similar risk categories that: (1) Are not permissible under applicable State law; or (2) In the 
absence of an applicable State law, do not reasonably correspond to differences in expected costs.” Id. 
§ 154.205(d). 
93 Id. § 154.230(c). 
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time for [the insurance company] to immediately rescind the rates, issue refunds to 
consumers or publicly explain their refusal to do so.”94 
In addition, as a condition of receiving “premium review grants,” state insurance 
commissioners are required to make appropriate recommendations “to the State 
Exchange about whether particular health insurance issuers should be excluded from 
participation in the Exchange based on a pattern or practice of excessive or 
unjustified premium increases.”95 HHS, in conjunction with the states, is directed to 
“monitor premium increases of health insurance offered through an Exchange and 
outside of an Exchange.”96 The statute also permits the states, in deciding whether to 
include large group qualified health plans in the exchanges, to consider “any excess 
of premium growth outside the Exchange as compared to the rate of growth inside 
the Exchange.”97 These provisions may well enable HHS, and/or the states, to 
influence the rates charged in the large group market, even when no large group 
coverage is offered through an exchange.  
In addition, the separate authority of the states (with the potential 
encouragement of HHS) to exclude from the exchanges any small group or 
individual plan that has excessive or unjustified premium increases may prove to 
give the states a de facto power to set maximum rates, which brings the entire ACA 
closer to a traditional ratemaking situation applied to public utilities. The source of 
this power lies in the ability of the states to exclude recalcitrant insurers from the 
exchanges’ health insurance markets, which are the only markets in which tax 
credits are available to assist individuals with purchasing health insurance. Being 
unable to access this potentially new and ever-expanding market may well place the 
excluded insurers at a decisive competitive disadvantage in comparison to those 
insurers that operate in the exchange. Which way the ultimate balance runs, 
however, is presently quite unclear because there is no guarantee that the subsidy 
will be sufficient to offset the stiff requirements imposed on all exchange carriers. 
The situation is even more perilous, however, because the decision not to participate 
in these exchanges does not relieve the firm from obligations under the ACA, 
including (for small group plans and issuers offering individual and small group 
coverage) offering the essential healthcare packages, which deny them any 
flexibility in the kinds of coverage they may offer.  
There is a critical efficiency loss attributable to this regimentation of healthcare 
plans. In the open market, competition takes place not only with respect to price, but 
also with respect to other features of these complex business arrangements between 
insurer and insured. Some of these differences are embodied in contractual 
provisions with their customers that alter the bundle of goods in order to maximize 
the gains from trade in the market. Still other differences come from the choice of 
specialized services to be offered, or in the locations where they are offered. The 
relentless standardization under the ACA stifles the competition in all of these 
relevant dimensions. In so doing, it causes a loss of much of the business know-how 
that, in unregulated markets, count as important firm assets, which are often 
protected as trade secrets. These losses make the position of all firms more perilous 
                                                 
94 News Release, Affordable Care Act Holding Insurers Accountable for Premium Hikes, Health 
& Human Servs. (Jan. 12, 2012), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/ 
01/20120112a.html. 
95 Public Health Service Act § 2794(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-94 (West 2012). Such 
commissioners are also required to provide information to HHS on trends in premium increases. 
96 Id. § 2794(b)(2)(A). 
97 Id. § 2794(b)(2)(B). 
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than before. They also increase the odds that the ACA’s novel web of provisions 
could force insurers to acquiesce to the lower rates demanded by HHS or the 
states—if it does not drive them out of business, either nationally or in particular 
states. 
2. Medical Loss Ratio 
Subject to the qualifications set out above, the ACA does not contain any 
explicit rate regulations. Nonetheless, it does contain provisions that influence the 
rates that health insurers can charge and the rebates that they must offer. In its most 
notable provision, the ACA requires that health insurance issuers in the small group 
or individual markets spend at least eighty percent of premium revenue, and that 
health insurance issuers in the large group market spend at least eighty-five percent 
of premium revenue98 on medical claims or clinical services, and healthcare quality 
activities. If they do not, they are required to refund the difference to enrollees on an 
annual basis. Grandfathered plans and plans and policies that are not offered over the 
exchanges are subject to this provision.99  
Health insurance companies (including those offering grandfathered plans) are 
required to submit an annual report to HHS on the ratio of incurred losses (or 
claims) and loss adjustment expense to earned premium (the “medical loss ratio”).100 
These reports are required to include the percentage of premium dollars (after 
accounting for risk adjustment, risk corridor, and reinsurance payments or receipts) 
spent on “clinical services,” activities to improve healthcare quality, and all other 
non-claim costs (not including federal or state taxes and licensing or regulatory fees, 
and after certain fees are excluded) beginning with the 2010 plan year.101 
Implementing regulations require the reporting of the amount of premium revenue 
received for the MLR reporting year,102 and the amounts expended on (1) 
reimbursements for clinical services provided to enrollees;103 (2) activities that 
improve healthcare quality for enrollees;104 (3) all other “non-claims” costs;105 and 
                                                 
98 Id. § 2718. 
99 Small and large group determinations are based on the number of employees—regardless of 
whether they are full-time or part-time—employed by the employer sponsor. The ACA increased the 
small group limit from fifty to 100 employees, see id. § 2794, but until 2016, states can elect to use 
fifty employees as the size limit for small group plans for purposes of the MLR. 45 C.F.R. § 158.103 
(2010) (defining large employer). 
100 Public Health Service Act § 2718(a). 
101 Id. § 2718(a). 
102 45 C.F.R. § 158.130. 
103 This includes direct claims paid to providers, including under capitation arrangements, unpaid 
claim reserves associated with claims incurred during the MLR reporting year, the change in contract 
reserves, reserves for contingent benefits and the claim portion of lawsuits, and any experience rating 
refunds paid or received. Id. § 158.140(a) (defining “incurred claims”). 
104 Under the regulations, an activity only constitutes a quality improvement activity if it falls 
into one of the categories in PHS Act section 2717 and meets four other requirements set forth in the 
regulation. Id. § 158.150(b). The regulations specifically identify certain activities that cannot be 
reported as quality improvement activities. See id. § 158.150(c). Only certain health information 
technology expenditures can be considered quality improvement activities. Id. § 158.151.  
105 This includes expenses for administrative services, including cost-containment expenses that 
are not included as a quality improvement expenditure, loss adjustment expenses, salaries and 
benefits, agents’ and brokers’ fees and commissions, general and administrative expenses (including 
expenditures for regulatory compliance), and community benefit expenditures. Id. § 158.160(b)(2). 
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(4) federal and state taxes and licensing and regulatory fees.106 Each issuer (i.e., legal 
entity) must separately report this information (even if under common ownership 
with other issuers) on a state-by-state basis for each of the large group, small group, 
and individual markets.107 
Beginning in 2011, if the percentage of revenue spent on clinical services and 
healthcare quality activities does not meet or exceed eighty-five percent of the total 
premium revenue (excluding federal and state taxes and licensing or regulatory fees, 
and after accounting for risk adjustment, risk corridor, and reinsurance payments or 
receipts) in the large group market or eighty percent of the total premium revenue in 
the individual or small group market, the insurer is required to pay a rebate to each 
enrollee under such coverage on a pro rata basis in the amount of the difference.108 
The ACA authorizes individual states to increase the amounts that must be spent on 
claims and quality improvement activities by increasing the MLR (and, thus, 
decrease the amount of revenue available for administrative and other expenses).109 
HHS can adjust (i.e., reduce) the MLR and the rebate requirement in the individual 
market if it finds that such rebates will destabilize the market in a state.110 In 
addition, HHS can adjust (reduce) certain MLR rates (and, thus, increase the 
amounts insurers can spend on administrative costs) if it deems it appropriate on 
account of the volatility of the individual market due to the establishment of the 
exchanges.111  
States cannot unilaterally reduce the ACA-required MLRs for the benefit of the 
health insurance companies. Under the ACA and the MLR regulations, a state, but 
not the health insurance company, may file an application for such adjustments in or 
reductions of the MLR in order to allow its own insurers to increase administrative 
costs without facing a rebate obligation.112 As of February 16, 2012, HHS has 
received a total of eighteen requests from states or territories for temporary 
reductions to the statutory MLR, to reduce the MLR and, accordingly, decrease the 
amount of premium revenue required to be spent on claims and quality improvement 
activities, and, thereby, increase the amounts that can be spent on administrative and 
other expenses.113 HHS has resolved these requests by completely denying eleven 
requests and apparently granting (but only in part) the other seven.114 
                                                 
106 Id. §§ 158.161-.162. These provisions permit the exclusion of federal and state taxes and 
certain licensing and regulatory fees, but not of federal income taxes on investment income and 
capital gains. Id. § 158.161(a).  
107 Id. § 158.120. 
108 Public Health Service Act § 2718(b)(1)(A), amended by Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act § 10101(f), 124 Stat. 119, 885-91, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-18 (West 2012). Starting in 2014, 
calculation of the MLR is to be based on the average of the premiums expensed on the costs and the 
total premium revenue for each of the previous three years for the plan. Id.; see also 45 C.F.R. 
§ 158.221. 
109 See id. § 158.211. In making such adjustments in the rebate requirement, the state is directed 
to “seek to ensure adequate participation by health insurance insurers, competition in the health 
insurance market in the State and value for consumers so that premiums are used for clinical services 
and quality improvements.” Public Health Service Act § 2718(b)(2). 
110 See 45 C.F.R. § 158.301. 
111 Public Health Service Act § 2718(d). 
112 45 C.F.R. § 158.301. 
113 See Medical Loss Ratio, CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE 
& MEDICAID SERVS., http://cciio.cms.gov/programs/marketreforms/mlr/index.html (last visited Apr. 3, 
2012). 
114 Id. 
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Implementing regulations provide direction to issuers on how to calculate the 
MLR,115 and provide for adjustment to the MLR based on the credibility of the 
issuer’s experience.116 To the extent that the MLR is less than required, a rebate is 
payable to each enrollee or to the group policyholder, subject to an exception for de 
minimis rebates.117 Issuers are also required to report payments of MLR rebates to 
HHS, and to provide notice of any MLR rebates to current group health plan 
subscribers, group policyholders, and subscribers in the individual market. The 
notices must contain certain specified information, including how rebates may be 
used in the group market.118 HHS may defer an issuer’s obligation to pay MLR 
rebates only if such payments would cause its risk-based capital level to fall below 
specific regulatory thresholds (relating to solvency), and the relevant state regulatory 
official so informs HHS.119 If HHS determines that this would occur, it may defer 
payment of all or a portion of the rebates, but only for the period of time determined 
by HHS in consultation with the state. At such time when the payment would not 
cause the issuer’s risk-based capital to fall below the regulatory solvency thresholds, 
the issuer would be required to pay the rebates plus interest.120 
Because the MLR provision caps non-claim and non-quality improvement 
activities at twenty percent for the small group and individual market and fifteen 
percent in the large group market121—which is generally lower than pre-ACA state-
imposed MLRs (and defined differently)—it effectively caps administrative 
expenses (including regulatory compliance costs) and profits at those below-market 
percentages. This occurs when statutory compliance costs are sure to rise because of 
multiple compliance requirements that are chocked in the statute. As we shall now 
demonstrate, it is easy to envision scenarios in which the MLR provision may 
preclude insurance companies from earning any return on their investment. It is even 
possible to envision scenarios in which insurance companies may be required to pay 
rebates while operating at a loss. Indeed, it is clear that in many cases the application 
of the statute could drive otherwise stable companies into bankruptcy if they are 
caught by the one-two punch of higher costs and lower revenues. The only 
temporary relief from the obligation to pay any required MLR rebates occurs if the 
company’s solvency is threatened by the payment of the rebates. 
III. THE ECONOMIC AND CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
We are now in a position to examine the constitutionality of the ACA in light of 
its many interlocking health insurance market provisions. The initial point of 
concern is the fundamental theory of regulation that drives this statute. We take it as 
a given that no health insurance carrier, no matter how large, shares any of the 
                                                 
115 45 C.F.R. § 158.221. 
116 Id. §§ 158.230-.232. Any MLR based on experience from fewer than 1000 life-years is not 
credible and no rebates are owed for non-credible experience/plans. Credibility adjustments are 
permitted for MLRs based on experience of 1000 to 75,000 life-years, deemed “partially credible.” Id. 
117 Id. §§ 158.240, 158.242-.244. Under the exception, which insurers may choose to employ, all 
de minimis rebates must be aggregated by market and distributed in equal amounts to all enrollees 
entitled to a rebate. Rebates can be paid to the group policyholder in the case of group health plans 
that are not subject to Employee Retirement Income Security Act and are not non-federal 
governmental plans only if the issuer receives written assurance that the rebates will be used to benefit 
enrollees. Id. 
118 Id. §§ 158.260, 158.250. 
119 Id. § 158.270(a). 
120 Id. § 158.270(d). 
121 See supra note 105 and citation therein. 
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inherent characteristics of the standard regulated public utilities, such as gas and 
electricity. Those public utilities all operate in particular territories where they are 
shielded from competition either by explicit legal protections or by the high cost of 
entry. They also supply a single homogeneous good—gas or electricity—that is easy 
to deliver and measure, and thus to regulate. It is an established theorem in these 
markets that a single firm that is left unconstrained by the threat of new entry can 
price their services in ways that yield monopoly rates of return extracted from 
consumers who have nowhere else to go. Accordingly, the hallmark of this form of 
public utility regulation is a “take all customers position” that requires that all rates 
be set on a “reasonable and nondiscriminatory basis” for the benefit of customers.122 
The utility’s quid pro quo is a rate of return that is consistent with the risk-adjusted 
rate of return on the investments of competitive industries. 
At this stage, we do not want to accept uncritically the desirability of all public 
utility regulation, for its ultimate soundness depends on a wide range of features that 
deal with a number of factors.123 Some short-term regulation can, for example, deter 
entry by new players whose technological improvements could turn an existing 
monopolistic industry into a competitive one. Conversely, some regulatory regimes 
can be so oppressive as to starve the regulated firms of the capital needed for long-
term improvements.  
For our purposes, however, the simple point is that when these errors take place 
in the public utility context, there remains a cushion of potential industry profits that 
explains why the regulation of such natural monopolies could make sense. There is, 
as far as we can see, no parallel justification in the health insurance market. There 
are no territorial or product monopolies. There is cut-throat competition among large 
and sophisticated suppliers who deal with sophisticated employers who know that if 
they do not supply decent coverage to their employees, they risk the loss of their 
services. There are smaller group purchasers that are anxious about healthcare costs, 
and individuals who also search the market. There are barriers to interstate 
competition (which have been made worse under the ACA), but these are often 
avoided by big national companies that compete through local subsidiary 
corporations. What is missing is any systematic evidence that these markets fail 
because of excessive concentration of a few firms that might, in principle, justify 
rate regulation. There are, to be sure, always informational gaps in health insurance 
markets, but many of these are already subject to a variety of disclosure 
regulations—and are now subject to additional disclosure requirements under the 
ACA. The ACA is not after that small game, however. While some ACA provisions 
may be aimed at requiring additional disclosure to remedy perceived information 
gaps, most disclosures required by the ACA are provided to government agencies, 
which use that information to set the terms and conditions for the regulated party, or 
to monitor whether the insurer is in compliance with ACA requirements.124 
The simplest challenge to this regulation is that it ignores all of the differences 
between public utilities and insurance companies. It then compounds the problem by 
                                                 
122 See Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Public Utilities?, 11 U. CHI. J.L & ECON., 55, 55-65 
(1968); Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 548-643 
(1969). 
123 See sources cited supra note 122 for the sustained critiques. 
124 Speaking generally, disclosure requirements work best in free, competitive markets, where the 
disclosure rectifies informational imbalance. In a highly regulated market, the benefit from 
information disclosure requirements may be marginal, given that other regulatory requirements may 
address the result of the informational imbalance (e.g., disclosure of prices/premium increases versus 
rate regulation). 
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treating health insurance firms as though they were monopolistic public utilities, 
without affording them the protection that the Constitution extends to these firms.125 
Tick down the features that bit by bit convert health insurance companies from 
market firms to regulated industries. The ACA requires guaranteed issue and 
renewability, which means that they must take all customers who fall within a given 
group, as it is with public utilities. There is a provision on rescissions that parallels 
the rule that all customers must be served on the system. There is an essential health 
benefits package that cannot be reduced, which parallels the minimum service 
provisions applicable to public utilities. There is community rating, which is the 
imposition of cross-subsidies similar to those found in many regulated industries, 
including, by way of example, the conscious decision in the telecommunications 
industry to have rates charged to businesses subsidize homeowner rates. Those 
subsidies are not possible in a competitive industry. In the ACA, there is a set of 
complex mechanisms that imposes de facto rate limitations. The MLR is one such 
device, and the ability of the federal government (or the state insurance regulators) 
to declare rate increases unreasonable, and thus force companies off the exchanges is 
a powerful price control mechanism. The usual reference to an exchange is a place 
where all can come to sell their own products on their own terms. In this context, 
however, the exchange reduces all freedom on price and quality of goods.  
Indeed, there is only one feature of the standard public utility that is not present: 
protection of constitutional rates of return. Our position is that this cannot be 
achieved in practice by any scheme that combines, as the ACA does, higher 
compliance costs and lower rates of return. That outcome is a constant no matter 
what particular course of action is taken by the federal government and the various 
states, either acting alone or in concert, in going about their regulatory business. If 
we start from the assumption that the firms in this industry are now earning only a 
risk-adjusted competitive rate of return—and no one has suggested otherwise—what 
justification is there for imposing this huge set of requirements on the entire 
industry? In this situation, there are some differences of position between those 
health insurance issuers that are on the exchange and those that are not. But this is 
decidedly not the case where regulation is imposed only on those firms that have 
opted voluntarily into the ACA. To opt in voluntarily necessarily implies that one 
could opt out without penalty. Yet the ACA and the implementing regulations make 
it very clear that grandfathering is at most a ghostly presence that will likely not last 
a generation, and that any health insurance providers that leave the ostensible 
cocoon of the exchanges will not be free of government regulation. We see this as a 
“damned if you do, damned if you don’t” situation. We also see that the interlocking 
and overlapping set of ACA provisions makes it hard to draw any hard-and-fast line 
between various different types of plans based on the differential impact of 
government regulation. What happens in one area will clearly influence the 
marketing prospects that happen in the next. The regulation of health insurance 
                                                 
125 For early statements of this position, see Richard A. Epstein, Impermissible Ratemaking in 
Health-Insurance Reform: Why the Reid Bill Is Unconstitutional, MED. PROGRESS TODAY (Dec. 18, 
2009), http://www.medicalprogresstoday.com/enewsletters/mpt_ind.php?pid=1834&nid=250, for 
which Paula Stannard supplied extensive assistance, and the spin-off column, Richard A. Epstein, 
Harry Reid Turns Insurance Into a Public Utility, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 22, 2009), 
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nion_main (“The health bill creates a massive cash crunch and then bankruptcies for many insurers.”). 
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markets stands or falls as a whole, given the inability to disentangle its component 
parts. 
We do not think that the case for regulation can be made on the ground of 
improved efficiency. Quite simply, it is hard to see what lingering market 
inefficiency survives with health insurance firms that are already subject to multiple 
levels of regulation. Freed from regulation, all these health insurance companies 
have the conventional incentive to maximize their profits, which in the standard 
scenario means that they will only engage in certain expenditures to the point where 
the extra dollar that is paid out brings an extra dollar in. The entire edifice of 
antitrust law rests on the assumption that this desirable equilibrium is routinely 
reached in competitive markets. Without explanation, the ACA assumes that these 
markets fail by that test, without showing wherein that failure lies. To be clear, the 
justification for the MLRs cannot be that firms do not minimize administrative costs 
in order to maximize profits. They are doing that right now with their current 
allocation of services, so that the additional limits on administrative costs mean that 
certain important services, such as fraud prevention, are necessarily curtailed 
because of the want of the needed resources to combat them. 
A second objection is that the costs have to be lowered in order to increase 
access to healthcare. True enough, but that could be done without the extensive web 
of regulations under the ACA. A simple decision to open up insurance markets to 
interstate competition, or to allow nontraditional firms, such as retailers and drug 
stores, to compete in the healthcare market, or to eliminate mandates, could all 
achieve these goals. What cannot be said is that the higher costs justify regulatory 
requirements such as the MLR, which may impose losses on firms that now are 
required to take all comers. This spurious high-cost justification has never worked in 
ordinary public utility regulation, and it should not be allowed to work here, where it 
would in short order not only deprive firms of a sensible rate of return but could 
drive them into bankruptcy. It might, in principle, be acceptable to make up the 
shortfall out of general tax revenues, but that alternative was expressly negated in 
this case, where the entire history of the ACA shows that its supporters moved 
heaven and earth to keep it out of the tax system.126 
At this point, the question is the likelihood that the regulated firms’ return on 
investment meets the appropriate constitutional standard. It cannot if competitive 
markets are throttled. One desirable feature of markets is that parties enter into 
agreements only when entities on both sides of the transaction perceive gains from 
trade. The way in which these gains are created is that the sellers of any given type 
of product seek to ensure that each attribute of that product is worth more to the 
consumer than its cost. The endless package of mandates that is imposed through the 
ACA is not battle-tested in that fashion. Consumers of a given income level, given 
full information about these various features, could easily decide to do without some 
higher level of protection in order to free up money to acquire alternative goods and 
services. Indeed, one of the main reasons for the decline in employer-sponsored 
insurance coverage has been the proliferation of mandates at the state level, all of 
which cost more than they are worth to consumers. The Council for Affordable 
Health Insurance produced a detailed catalogue of some 1961 state mandates as of 
                                                 
126 See, e.g., Obama: Requiring Health Insurance Is Not a Tax Increase, CNN.COM (Sept. 20, 
2009) (“For us to say you have to take responsibility to get health insurance is absolutely not a tax 
increase.”), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-09-20/politics/obama.health.care_1_health-insurance-
coverage-mandate-medicare-advantage?_s=PM:POLITICS. 
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2008.127 One or two mandates might not sink an insurance policy. But a dozen or 
two might well not only lead to a reduction in the parties’ surplus, but also reverse 
the ratio of costs to benefits so that the coverage is dropped. 
The implicit assumption of the entire ACA is that the “right” to healthcare can 
be evaluated without any consideration of the correlative duties that are imposed on 
others. Thus, the argument that it is unfair to charge individuals a higher premium 
for pre-existing conditions flies in the face of traditional insurance law because it 
requires the insurer to charge a fee that does not cover the loss in question.128 In 
order for the business to survive, therefore, it must charge other customers—those 
who have the opportunity to pay the low cost of exit from the plans (i.e., the low 
penalty)—to pick up the difference. There is little or no reason to think that anything 
in the ACA calibrates those higher charges to offset the subsidies that are created. 
The only alternative, therefore, is for the health insurer to provide the coverage at a 
loss. What is true about pre-existing conditions is true about every one of the 
detailed provisions that relate to guaranteed issue, automatic renewal, community 
rating, minimum coverage, and so on. If these provisions made sense, they would be 
in the policies or plans already. But since they generally are not in all policies, we 
have to assume that each of them is in some sense an economic loser. 
Within the basic framework, therefore, the rate-of-return argument seems clear. 
In dealing with the same issue in connection with the debit charge interchange fee, 
one of us (Epstein) gave a few simple mathematical relationships to demonstrate 
what should be accepted without such argument. In a competitive industry, there is 
no way in which to lower rates, raise costs, and preserve a risk-adjusted competitive 
rate of return.129 
At this point, the argument from confiscation runs as follows. There is no 
pretense whatsoever that the new regulations in question will apply solely to new 
firms who have entered the market. The use of such regulations would be unwise 
insofar as it distorts competitive costs, but it would be constitutional under the Hope 
Natural Gas test or any of its permutations, because the new arrival would have 
entered the business with open eyes and, thus, would have to take whatever the legal 
regime imposed. Yet it is precisely for that reason we can be confident that few 
firms will choose to enter the health insurance industry now if they know that they 
have to face the ACA regulations for existing firms. Existing firms, however, do not 
have effective exit rights because of the huge amount of capital that they have sunk 
into their businesses, which will have to be sold for salvage value if they quit the 
business. Their business goodwill would be gone in liquidation; their existing leases 
and service contracts would have to be cancelled, often with payments to suppliers; 
                                                 
127 For discussion, see VICTORIA CRAIG BUNCE & JP WIESKE, COUNCIL FOR AFFORDABLE 
HEALTH INS., HEALTH INSURANCE MANDATES IN THE STATES 2008, at 2 (2008), available at 
http://heartland.org/sites/all/modules/custom/heartland_migration/files/pdfs/23616.pdf. For updates, 
see VICTORIA CRAIG BUNCE & JP WIESKE, COUNCIL FOR AFFORDABLE HEALTH INS., HEALTH 
INSURANCE MANDATES IN THE STATES 2010 (2010), available at http://cdm15029.contentdm.oclc.org/ 
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way.” Id. For the dislocations from mandates, see Richard A. Epstein, Bleak Prospects: How Health 
Care Reform Has Failed in the United States, 15 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1 (2010). 
128 Prior limitations on the use of pre-existing condition exclusions were applicable where 
individuals had a certain amount of “creditable coverage”—that is, they had obtained insurance (even 
if not with the particular insurer) for a certain period of time. The purpose of this provision is to offer 
some assurance to insurers that the individuals had paid premiums to an insurer and were not engaging 
in strategic behavior. See supra at note 49. 
129 For the particulars, see Epstein, Durbin’s Folly, supra note 4, at 69.  
266 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 38 NO. 2&3 2012 
and their internal management and operations systems would be worth at most a 
fraction of their value, if worth anything at all. The ability to sell the entire business 
could only take place at a huge discount because no sensible buyer would pay a price 
that guarantees it a real loss. There is no doubt that existing firms would have 
substantial losses. In dealing with the same issue in connection with the Durbin 
Amendment, one of us (Epstein) dealt with the Durbin paradox: there is no sensible 
way to say that firms in competitive markets get no protection when firms that have 
the cushion of a natural monopoly do get that protection.130 The risk of confiscation 
through low rates, which is present in both cases, is surely greater for the 
competitive firm that is operating at the margin than it is for the monopolist that has 
some price cushion from punitive rate regulation. We conclude, therefore, that the 
only sensible reading of the situation is that the higher compliance costs and lower 
revenues are, in constitutional terms, a fatal combination. 
But what about the general rule that does not allow for these challenges until 
there is an actual conflict with the law? In our view, there are two answers to that 
question. The first is that, in ordinary ratemaking hearings, the regulated firm gets to 
challenge the rates prior to their being put into place. It is widely understood that 
being forced to operate at a loss cannot be offset by allowing the firm to recoup 
additional sums from customers later in the process if the rates prove too low. In 
these cases, the rates are allowed and refunds to customers, administratively a far 
easier process, can be ordered if the rates prove to be excessive. In principle, the 
ACA allows a hearing of this sort, but no matter how the responsibility for that 
review is allocated between state and federal officials, it may not be credible to 
believe that these reviews can be accomplished in an orderly fashion. That orderly 
outcome is even less likely given the large number of individual cases that are likely 
to be subject to administrative review at any one time. Yet the ACA makes no 
provision at all for what interim rate increases, if any, should be allowed pending 
completion of the state or federal review. The central principle that rate reductions 
should be publicly vetted before they are implemented looks to be a casualty of the 
ACA.  
The second answer goes to the question of whether regulated firms can show 
losses in all events. In one sense, these economic losses need not arise, given the 
degree of discretion that is lodged in the system. The government could always back 
off at critical moments. But we already have enough information that regulators are 
in no mood to compromise. There are an enormous number of firms that are subject 
to regulation. It seems a virtual certainty that some of them will be cut down by the 
regulations, given that the inability to control the customer base will lead to some 
subset of health insurance providers who, by the luck of the draw, will be saddled 
with far more expensive pools than their competitors, for which ad hoc adjustments 
after the fact are likely to fall short. It is equally clear that the forms of relief on a 
case-by-case basis are likely to be late-coming and insufficient in amount. That 
difficulty is only more acute because the ACA’s transitional reinsurance and risk 
corridor programs, and its risk adjustment program, do not address the underlying 
problem of adverse selection and the strategic behavior of individual insureds. Those 
additional losses should be taken into account in setting rates, but there is no obvious 
mechanism in this program for doing so. It is possible, but not probable, to envision 
a set of successful health exchanges whose members can thrive while subject to a set 
of ad hoc rules that do not apply to their competitors. It is possible, but not probable, 
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to think that all of these health plans can make money when, unlike public utilities, 
they enjoy no territorial monopoly and face customers armed with a credible option 
to drop their health insurance coverage in times of slack demand. To insist that each 
firm should be placed on a different timetable for rate review is to guarantee that no 
one in any part of the market can plan his affairs in a coherent fashion. The 
difference in market structure fully justifies pulling back from a rule that promises 
relief only after the system has collapsed.  
We think that comprehensive and forward-looking relief is justified for yet 
another reason. These restrictions are so draconian that in most cases the fight about 
individual rates in the face of system-wide uncertainty is little better than 
rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. The supposed subsidies made available 
under the ACA may bring additional consumers into the healthcare market. But they 
will do nothing to ease the problems of companies who care more about the number 
of dollars coming their way than the source of those dollars and find that, as a result 
of all of the health insurance market provisions, the dollars are insufficient to meet 
their new obligations. At this point, the only real quarrel is, as with the Durbin 
Amendment, with the size of the future losses incurred once this scheme is put into 
place. But since the government under the ACA has absolutely no intention to 
compensate firms for their regulatory losses, immediate judicial relief is appropriate 
to prevent massive business losses that will take place under the new ACA 
provisions. The damage from insufficient rates pervades the warp and woof of the 
ACA. The regulatory takings argument thus has real weight even if the problems 
with the individual mandate and the Medicaid program are put to one side. 
IV. CONCLUSION  
We are well aware of the conventional wisdom that holds that it is impossible to 
mount credible rate-of-return challenges to financial regulation in the health 
insurance industry. Nonetheless, we think that this general view rests on certain 
basic misapprehensions that this Article is intended to correct. First, there are cases 
today where the requirement of a “bottom line” rate of return has led courts to block 
the imposition of confiscatory rates. These precedents fall on fertile ground under 
the ACA. We have shown that the ACA imposes heavy-handed regulation of key 
features of the standard insurance policy. These address guaranteed issue and 
renewability, with the inability to price separately for pre-existing conditions; the 
ability of customers to go in and out of coverage on a strategic basis; the cross 
subsidies of community rating; and the heavy clubs over rates found in the ability of 
the government to pressure firms to decrease or eliminate rate increases, to exclude 
non-complying firms from the exchanges, and to order rebates when expenditures 
exceed some preset medical loss ratio that allocates to administrative costs and 
overhead less than virtually all private plans do in the voluntary market. We do not 
think that it can be the case that every private firm is deficient in ways that 
government regulation can fix without serious dislocation. On these issues, the real 
knowledge base is in the private sector, which is under assault in a multi-front war. 
Given that these mandates and restrictions were adopted as part of a package of 
health insurance market reforms, they must be evaluated as part of a package. Once 
that is done, it is clear that few, if any, new firms will enter this market, and those 
who are already there are at risk of expropriation of their invested capital—that is, of 
failing to earn a risk-adjusted rate of return on their investment. In a case where the 
fates of so many competitive firms are heavily entwined, there is no room for error 
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in setting rates or in supplying relief. We conclude, therefore, that the only way to 
avoid the risk of chaos in the health insurance market is to repeal or strike down this 
legislation, leaving it to Congress to devise a plan that better addresses the desire to 
improve access, quality, and cost in healthcare systems. 
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